The Gale-Shapley algorithm for the Stable Marriage Problem is known to take Θ(n 2 ) steps to find a stable marriage in the worst case, but only Θ(n log n) steps in the average case (with n women and n men). In 1976, Knuth asked whether the worst-case running time can be improved in a model of computation that does not require sequential access to the whole input. A partial negative answer was given by Ng and Hirschberg, who showed that Θ(n 2 ) queries are required in a model that allows certain natural random-access queries to the participants' preferences. A significantly more general -albeit slightly weaker -lower bound follows from Segal's elaborate analysis of communication complexity, namely that Ω(n 2 ) Boolean queries are required in order to find a stable marriage, regardless of the set of allowed Boolean queries.
Introduction
In the classic Stable Marriage Problem [4] , there are n women and n men; each woman has a full preference order over the men and each man has a full preference order over the women. The challenge is to find a stable marriage: a one-to-one mapping between women and men that is a survey). We consider a scenario in which Alice holds the preferences of the n women and Bob holds the preferences of the n men, and show that each of the problems from Theorem 1.1 requires the exchange of Ω(n 2 ) bits of communication between Alice and Bob.
We note that Segal [15] shows by an elaborate argument that any deterministic communication protocol among all 2n participants for finding a stable marriage requires Ω(n 2 ) bits of communication. Our argument for Theorem 1.1(a), in addition to being significantly simpler, generalizes Segal's result to account for randomized algorithms, 3 and even when considering only two-party communication between Alice and Bob (essentially allowing arbitrary communication within the set of women and within the set of men without cost); furthermore, our lower bound holds even for merely verifying that a given marriage is stable (Theorem 1.1(b)), as well as for finding an approximately-stable marriage and for the additional related problems described in Theorem 1.1(c,d). These results immediately imply the same lower bounds for any type of Boolean queries in the original computation model, as Boolean queries can be simulated by a communication protocol.
As indicated above, Theorem 1.1(a), as well as the corresponding lower bound on the two-party communication complexity, holds not only for stable marriages but also for approximately-stable marriages, where an approximately-stable marriage is one that is, in a precise sense, not far from a stable marriage. In the context of communication complexity, Chou and Lu [1] also study such a relaxation of the stable marriage problem in a restricted computational model in which communication is non-interactive (a sketching model); Chou and Lu show that any (deterministic, non-interactive, 2n-party) protocol that finds a marriage where only a constant fraction of participants are involved in blocking pairs requires Θ(n 2 log n) bits of communication. Our results are not directly comparable to these, as the two notions of approximate stability are not comparable; furthermore, we use a significantly more general computation model (randomized, interactive, two-party), but give a slightly weaker lower bound.
Our lower bound for verification complexity (given in Theorem 1.1(b)) is tight. Indeed there exists a simple deterministic algorithm for verifying the stability of a proposed marriage, which requires O(n 2 ) queries even in the weak comparison model that allows only for queries of the form "does woman w prefer man m 1 over man m 2 ?" and, dually, "does man m prefer woman w 1 over woman w 2 ?". 4 We do not know whether the lower bound is tight also for finding a stable marriage (Theorem 1.1(a)). Gale and Shapley's algorithm uses O(n 2 ) queries in the worst case, but O(n 2 ) of these queries require each an answer of length log n bits, and thus the algorithm requires a total of O(n 2 log n) Boolean queries, or bits of communication. We do not know whether O(n 2 ) Boolean queries suffice for any algorithm. While the gap between Gale and Shapley's algorithm and our lower bound is small, we believe that it is interesting, as the number of queries performed by the algorithm is exactly linear in the input encoding length; an even slightly sublinear algorithm would therefore be interesting. 5 We indeed do not have any o(n 2 log n) algorithm, even randomized and even in the strong two-party communication model, nor do we have any improved ω(n 2 ) lower bound, even for deterministic algorithms and even in the simple comparison model.
Open Problem 1.1. Consider the Comparison model for stable marriage that only allows for queries of the form "does man m prefer woman w 1 over woman w 2 ?" and, dually, "does woman w prefer man m 1 over man m 2 ?". How many such queries are required, in the worst case, to find a stable marriage? For ease of presentation, we consider a simplified version of the model of Gale and Shapley [4] . Let W and M be disjoint finite sets, of women and men, respectively, such that |W | = |M |. Definition 2.1 (Full Preferences). 1 . A full preference list over M is a total ordering of M .
2.
A profile of full preference lists for W over M is a specification of a full preference list over M for each woman w ∈ W . We denote the set of all profiles of full preference lists for W over M by F(W, M ).
3. Given a profile P W of full preference lists for W over M , a woman w ∈ W is said to prefer a man m ∈ M over a man m ∈ M , denoted by m w m , if m precedes m on the preference list of w. We say that w ∈ W weakly prefers m over m if either m w m or m = m .
We define full preference lists over W and profiles of full preference lists for M over W analogously. 2. µ is said to be stable if no blocking pairs exist w.r.t. µ. Otherwise, µ is said to be unstable.
Arbitrary Preference Lists
While our main results are phrased in terms of full preference lists and perfect marriages, some additional and intermediate results in Section 4 and in the Appendix deal with an extended model, which allows for preferences to specify "blacklists" (i.e. declare some potential spouses as unacceptable) and for marriages to specify that some participants remain single. (This model is nonetheless also a simplified version of that of [4] .) A (not necessarily full) preference list over M is a totally-ordered subset of M . We once again interpret a preference list as a ranking, from best to worst, of acceptable spouses. We interpret participants absent from a preference list as declared unacceptable, even at the cost of remaining single. Analogously, a profile of preference lists for W over M is a specification of a preference list over M for each woman w ∈ W ; we denote the set of all profiles of preference lists for W over M by P(W, M ) ⊃ F(W, M ). In this extended model, a woman w is said to prefer a man m over a man m not only when m precedes m on the preference list of w, but also when m is on the preference list of w while m is not. Again, if we say that w weakly prefers m over m if either w prefers m over m or m = m . (We once again define preference lists and profiles of preference list for M over W analogously.) A (not necessarily perfect) marriage between W and M is a one-to-one mapping between a subset of W and a subset of M . Given a marriage µ, we denote the set of married women (i.e. the subset of W over which µ is defined) by W µ ; we analogously denote the set of married men by M µ . For a marriage µ to be stable (w.r.t P W and P M ), we require not only that no blocking pair exist with respect to it, but also that no participant p ∈ W ∪ M be married to someone not on the preference list of p.
We note that this model indeed generalizes the one from Section 2.1.1, in the sense that when the preference list of every participant contains all participants of the other side, then the definition of a stable marriage in this extended model (with respect to these preference lists) coincides with that of the simpler model (with respect to these preference lists when viewed as full preference lists). In particular, any marriage that is stable with respect to such preference lists prescribes for no participant to remain single.
Known Results
We now survey a few known results regarding the stable marriage problem, which we utilize throughout this paper. For the duration of this section, let W, M, P W , P M be a marriage market, defined either according to the definitions of Section 2. [10] ). The M -optimal stable marriage is also the W -worst stable marriage, i.e. every other stable marriage is weakly preferred over it by each woman.
. If a stable marriage is both the W -worst stable marriage and the M -worst stable marriage, then it is the unique stable marriage. Theorem 2.3 (Roth's Rural Hospitals Theorem [14] ). W µ (resp. M µ ) is the same for every stable marriage µ.
Approximately-Stable Marriages
In this section, we describe a notion of an "approximately-stable marriage". For ease of presentation, we restrict ourselves to marriage markets with full preference lists (i.e. the model described in Section 2.1.1). We define an approximately-stable marriage as a perfect marriage that shares many married pairs with some (exactly) stable (perfect) marriage. Our definition is a natural generalization of that ofÜnver [16] (who considers only marriage markets with unique stable marriages), but it appears to be novel in its exact formulation. Our notion of approximate stability has the theoretical advantage of being derived from a metric on the set of all perfect marriages between W and M . Definition 2.5. For any pair of perfect marriages µ, µ between W and M (where |W | = |M | = n), we define the divorce distance between µ and µ to be 6 d(µ, µ ) = n − µ ∩ µ .
Note that d measures the minimum number of divorces required to convert µ to µ (and vice versa). By abuse of notation, we denote the divorce distance to stability of a perfect marriage µ to be
where M is the set of all stable perfect marriages between W and M . Thus, d(µ) is the minimum number of divorces required to convert µ into a stable marriage.
We say that a marriage µ is
Example 2.1. d(µ) = 0 if and only if µ is stable. Therefore, for ε = 0 the concepts of 1-stability and 0-instability coincide precisely with (exact) stability and instability, respectively. Letting ε grow, (1 − ε)-stability is a weaker requirement for larger values of ε, while ε-instability is a stricter requirement for larger values of ε.
Remark 2.1. A more common notion of approximate stability is the requirement for a marriage to have relatively few blocking pairs; see e.g. [3] . Our definition of (1 − ε)-stability is strictly finer, which allows us to prove stronger lower bounds. Indeed, we note that our analysis regarding approximate stability crucially depends on this choice of definition -see the discussion in Section 6.
Communication Complexity
We work in Yao's [18] model of two-party communication complexity (see [9] for a survey). Consider a scenario where two agents, Alice and Bob, hold values x and y, respectively, and wish to collaborate in performing some computation that depends on both x and y. Such a computation typically requires the exchange of some data between Alice and Bob. The communication cost of a given protocol (i.e. distributed algorithm) for such a computation is the number of bits that Alice and Bob exchange under this protocol in the worst case (i.e. for the worst (x, y)); the communication complexity of the computation that Alice and Bob wish to perform is the lowest communication cost of any protocol for this computation. Generalizing, we also consider randomized communication complexity, defined analogously using randomized protocols that for every given fixed input, produce a correct output with probability at least 2 3 . 7 Of particular interest to us is the disjointness function, DISJ. Let n ∈ N and let Alice and Bob hold subsets A, B ⊆ [n], respectively. The value of the disjointness function is 1 if A ∩ B = ∅, and 0 otherwise. We can also consider DISJ as a Boolean function by identifying A and B with their respective characteristic vectorsx = (x i ) n i=1 andȳ = (y i ) n i=1 , defined by x i = 1 ⇐⇒ i ∈ A and y j = 1 ⇐⇒ j ∈ B. Thus, we can express DISJ using the Boolean formula DISJ(x,ȳ) = ¬ n i=1 (x i ∧ y i ). All of our results heavily rely on the following result of Kalyanasundaram and Schintger [7] (see also Razborov [13] ): Theorem 2.4 (Communication Complexity of DISJ [7, 13] ). Let n ∈ N. The randomized (and deterministic) communication complexity of calculating DISJ(x,ȳ), wherex ∈ {0, 1} n is held by 6 Abusing notation, we identify a perfect marriage µ with the set of married pairs w1, µ(w1) , w2, µ(w2) , . . . . Thus, µ ∩ µ is the set of pairs (couples) that are married in both µ and µ . 7 The results of this paper hold verbatim even if the constant 2 3 is replaced with any other fixed probability p with
Alice andȳ ∈ {0, 1} n is held by Bob, is Θ(n). Further, this lower bound holds even for unique disjointness, i.e. if we require that the inputsx andȳ are either disjoint or uniquely intersecting: |x ∩ȳ| ≤ 1.
Our results regarding lower bounds on communication complexities all follow from defining suitable embeddings of DISJ into various problems regarding stable marriages, i.e. mappingx andȳ into suitable marriage markets (more specifically, mappingx into P W andȳ into P M ), such that finding a stable marriage (or solving any of the other problems from Theorem 1.1) reveals the value of DISJ. Some of our proofs (namely those presented in Section 5) indeed assume that the input to DISJ satisfies |x ∩ȳ| ∈ {0, 1}.
Summary of Results
All of our results provide lower bounds for various computations regarding the stable marriage problem. For the duration of this section, let W = {w 1 , . . . , w n }, M = {m 1 , . . . , m n }, P W , P M be a marriage market with full preference lists, where P W is held by Alice and P M is held by Bob. Although Corollaries 3.1 and 3.2 are immediate consequences of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, respectively, we give direct proofs (of somewhat distinct flavors than those of Theorems 3.1 and 3.2) of these important special cases in Section 4. We believe these proofs (and the construction that they share) to be insightful in their own right; furthermore, the proof of Corollary 3.1 includes a novel application of the Rural Hospitals Theorem (Theorem 2.3), which we believe may be of independent interest. Theorem 3.5 (Query Complexity). Any randomized (or deterministic) algorithm that uses any type of Boolean queries to the women's and (separately) to the men's preferences to solve any of the following problems requires Ω(n 2 ) queries in the worst case: a. finding a (1 − ε)-stable marriage, for fixed ε with 0 ≤ ε < 1 2 . b. determining whether a given marriage µ is stable or ε-unstable, for fixed ε with 0 ≤ ε < 1.
c. determining whether a given pair is contained in some/every stable marriage.
d. finding any εn pairs that appear in some/every stable marriage, for fixed ε with 0 < ε ≤ 1.
The proofs of Theorems 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.5 are given in section 5.2. The proofs all follow from the embedding of disjointness into a marriage market that is described in Section 5.1.
Lower Bounds for Exact Stability
In this section, we give direct proofs of Corollaries 3.1 and 3.2, of a somewhat different flavor than the proofs given in Section 5. We prove these corollaries by embedding suitably large instances of DISJ into the problems of finding a stable marriage or verifying the stability of some marriage. Thus, by Theorem 2.4 we obtain the desired lower bounds on communication complexities. We note that the construction given in this section does not assume the input to DISJ to be uniquely intersecting.
Definition 4.1. Let n ∈ N. We denote the set of pairs of distinct elements of {1, . . . , n} by [n] 2 (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , n} 2 | i = j . We note that [n] 2 = n · (n − 1).
For the duration of this section, let n ∈ N, and let W = {w 1 , . . . , w n } and M = {m 1 , . . . , m n } be disjoint sets such that |W | = |M | = n. Let µ id be the perfect marriage in which w i is married to m i for every i. To prove Corollary 3.2, we embed disjointness into verification of stability.
Proof. To define P W (x), for every i we define the preference list of w i to consist of all m j s.t. x i j = 1, in arbitrary order (say, sorted by j), followed by m i , followed by all other men in arbitrary order. Similarly, to define P M (ȳ), for every j we define the preference list of m j to consist of all w i s.t. y i j = 1, in arbitrary order (say, sorted by i), followed by w j , followed by all other women arbitrary order. 
both of the following hold. a. If DISJ(x,ȳ) = 1, then µ id is the unique stable marriage with respect to P W (x) and P M (ȳ).
b. If DISJ(x,ȳ) = 0, then µ id is unstable with respect to P W (x) and P M (ȳ).
Proof. To define P W (x), for every i we define the preference list of w i to consist of all m j s.t.
x i j = 1, in arbitrary order (say, sorted by j), followed by m i (with all other men absent). Similarly, to define P M (ȳ), for every j we define the preference list of m j to consist of all w i s.t. y i j = 1, in arbitrary order (say, sorted by i), followed by w j (with all other women absent).
We first show that µ id is stable with respect to P W (x) and P M (ȳ) iff DISJ(x,ȳ) = 1. Indeed, since every participant is married by µ id to someone on their preference list, we have:
It remains to show that if µ id is stable with respect to P W (x) and P M (ȳ), then it is the unique stable marriage with respect to these profiles of preference lists. For the remainder of the proof assume, therefore, that µ id is stable (with respect to P W (x) and P M (ȳ)). Let µ be a stable marriage (with respect to these profiles of preference lists). As µ id is stable and perfect, by Theorem 2.3, since µ is stable, it is perfect as well. Therefore, each p ∈ W ∪ M is married by µ to someone on the preference list of p, and so p weakly prefers µ over µ id , as in the latter p is married to the last person on the preference list of p. Thus, µ id is both the W -worst stable marriage and the M -worst stable one, and so, by Corollary 2.1, µ id is the unique stable marriage. Corollary 3.1 follows from Lemma 4.2 by showing that we can embed the problem of finding a stable marriage with respect to possibly-partial preference lists into finding a stable marriage with respect to full preference lists. See Appendix A for details.
The techniques used to prove Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 can also be used to prove Theorem 3.3 -see Appendix B. Although Theorem 3.3 shows that determining the marital status of a fixed pair (w, m) requires Ω(n 2 ) communication, we do not know how to prove a similar lower bound for finding some married couple (see Open Problem 6.3 in Section 6). In the next section, we however show a weaker related result, namely that finding any constant fraction of the couples married in a stable marriage requires Ω(n 2 ) communication. This result stems from a different construction than that underlying the results of the current section. The construction that follows will also serve as the basis for our results regarding approximate stability.
General Proof of Main Results

Embedding Disjointness into Preferences
Similarly to the proofs given in Section 4, the proofs of the remaining results from Section 3 follow from embedding suitably large instances of DISJ into various problems regarding (approximately) stable marriages. In order to prove these remaining results, we reconstruct the embeddings to have the property that small changes in the participants' preferences yield very large changes in the global structure of the stable marriages for these preferences. Informally, we construct the preferences so that resolving blocking pairs resulting from such small changes in participants' preferences creates large rejection chains that ultimately affect most married couples.
Preference Description
Let n ∈ N and let W and M be disjoint s.t. |W | = |M | = n. We divide the participants into three sets: high, mid and low , which we denote W h , W m and W l respectively for the women and M h , M m and M l respectively for the men. These sets have sizes
where δ is a parameter with 0 < δ ≤ 1, to be chosen later. The low and mid participants preferences will be fixed, while we will use the preferences of the high participants to embed an instance of disjointness of size (δn) 2 /4. We assume that the participants are
where in both cases the first δn/2 participants are high, the next (1 − δ)n/2 participants are mid and the remaining n/2 participants are low. Since the low and mid participants' preferences are the same for all instances, we describe those first. As before, the participants' preferences are symmetric in the sense that the men's and women's preferences are constructed analogously. low participants The low women's preferences over men are "in order": m 1 m 2 · · · m n (and symmetrically for low men, whose preference over women are "in order"). In particular, each low participant prefers all high participants over all mid participants over all low participants.
mid participants The mid participants prefer low participants over high participants over mid participants. Within each group, the preferences are "in order." Specifically, the mid women have preferences m n/2+1 m n/2+2 · · · m n m 1 m 2 · · · m n/2 , and symmetrically for the men.
high participants We use the preferences of each of the high participants to encode a bit vector of length δn/2. Together, the men and women's preferences thus encode an instance of DISJ of size (δn) 2 /4. For each w i ∈ W h , we denote her bit vector x i 1 , . . . , x i δn/2 ; the preference list of w i , from most-preferred to least-preferred, is:
Within each group, the preferences are once again "in order", i.e. sorted by numeric index. The men's preferences are constructed analogously, with each man m j encoding the bit vector y 1 j , . . . , y δn/2 j and preferring first and foremost women w i ∈ W h such that y i j = 1. Figure 1 : The (unique) stable marriages µ 1 for disjoint (left) and µ 0 for uniquely-intersecting (right) instances of the preferences described in Section 5.1.1.
Stable Marriage Description
Lemma 5.1. Any instance of the stable marriage problem with preferences described above corresponding to DISJ(x,ȳ) = 1 has a unique stable marriage µ 1 given by (see the left side of Figure 1 )
Proof. Let µ be a stable marriage; we will show that µ = µ 1 . We first argue that every high and mid participant is married to a low participant in µ. Suppose to the contrary that some w = w i for i ≤ n/2 is married to some m = m j with j ≤ n/2 in µ. By the definition of the preferences and the assumption that DISJ(x,ȳ) = 1, at least one of w and m prefers every low participant over their spouse. Assume without loss of generality that w prefers all m = m j with j > n/2 over m. That is, w prefers all low men over her spouse m. Since w is married to a medium or high man, there must be some low man m that is married to a low woman w . But m prefers all high and medium women over w . In particular, he prefers w over w . Therefore, (w, m ) is a blocking pair, so µ is not stable. Thus any stable marriage must marry low participants to mid or high participants and vice versa. Now we argue that if (w i , m j+n/2 ) ∈ µ, then we must have i = j. The argument for pairs (w i+n/2 , m j ) is identical. Suppose that (w i , m j+n/2 ) ∈ µ with i < j. Then there is some j < j such that m = m j +n/2 is married to w = w i with i > i. But then (w i , m ) mutually prefer each other, contradicting the stability of µ. We arrive at a similar contradiction if i > j, hence we must have i = j, as desired.
Lemma 5.2. Suppose we have a stable marriage instance with preferences described above corresponding to DISJ(x,ȳ) = 0, withx andȳ uniquely intersecting. Let x α β = y α β = 1 be the uniquelyintersecting entry ofx,ȳ. In this case, there exists a unique stable marriage µ 0 given by (see the right side of Figure 1 )
Proof. We first argue that (w α , m β ) ∈ µ for any stable marriage µ for the preferences described above. Since µ is stable, if (m α , w β ) / ∈ µ, then at least one of w α and m β , say w α , must be married to someone she prefers over m β . From w α 's preferences, this implies that (w α , m) ∈ µ for some m = m j with j < β for which x α j = 1. Since the instance of DISJ is uniquely intersecting, we must have y α j = 0. Thus m prefers all low women over w α . Since at most n/2 − 1 medium and high men are married to low women (indeed m is a high man married to a high woman) and there are n/2 low women, some low woman w is married to a low man. But then w and m mutually prefer each other, hence forming a blocking pair. Thus, we must have (w α , m β ) ∈ µ.
The remainder of the proof of the lemma is analogous to the proof of Lemma 5.1 if we remove w α and m β from all the participants' preferences.
Lemma 5.3. The marriages µ 0 and µ 1 from the previous two lemmas satisfy d(µ 0 , µ 1 ) ≥ (1 − δ)n.
Proof. This follows from the following two observations:
1. All mid women and men M m ∪ W m have different spouses in µ 0 and µ 1 .
2.
No mid women are married to mid men in either µ 0 or µ 1 .
From these facts, we can conclude that d(µ 0 , µ 1 ) = n − |µ 0 ∩ µ 1 | ≥ |W m | + |M m | = (1 − δ)n.
Derivation of Main results
In this section we use the construction of Section 5.1 to prove all the results formulated in Section 3.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Suppose that Π is a randomized communication protocol (between Alice and Bob) that outputs a (1 − ε)-stable marriage µ using B bits of communication. As ε < 1/2, there exists δ sufficiently small such that ε < (1−δ)/2. Suppose Π outputs a (1−ε)-stable marriage µ for the preferences described in Section 5.1.1. If DISJ(x,ȳ) = 1, then by Lemma 5.1, µ 1 is the unique stable marriage, so d(µ, µ 1 ) ≤ εn.
Suppose DISJ(x,ȳ) = 0. By Lemma 5.2, µ 0 is the unique stable marriage, so d(µ, µ 0 ) ≤ εn < (1 − δ)n/2. Applying Lemma 5.3 and the triangle inequality, we obtain d(µ 1 , µ) > (1 − δ)n/2 > εn. Thus, if DISJ(x,ȳ) = 1, then d(µ, µ 1 ) < εn and if DISJ(x,ȳ) = 0, then d(µ, µ 1 ) > εn. Given µ, Alice and Bob can compute d(µ, µ 1 ) without communication, so they can use Π to determine the value of DISJ(x,ȳ) using B bits of communication. Thus, B = Ω(n 2 ) by Theorem 2.4, as desired.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Suppose that Π is a randomized communication protocol that determines whether a given marriage µ is stable or ε-unstable with respect to given preferences using B bits of communication. As ε < 1, there exists δ sufficiently small such that 1 − δ > ε. Let µ 1 be the marriage defined in Lemma 5.1; by that lemma, if DISJ(x,ȳ) = 1, then µ 1 is stable (with respect to the preferences described in Section 5.1.1). By Lemmas 5. Proof of Theorem 3.4. Suppose that Π is a randomized communication protocol that outputs εn pairs contained in some (every) stable marriage using B bits of communication. Choose preferences as described in the Section 5.1.1 with some 0 < δ < ε, say δ = ε/2. Recall from the proof of Lemma 5.3 that no participants in W m and M m are ever married to one another in a stable marriage. Therefore, since |W m | + |M m | = (1 − δ)n > (1 − ε)n and since Π outputs εn pairs, we have that Π must output some pair (w, m) with w ∈ W m or m ∈ M m . Recall from the proof of Lemma 5.3 that knowing the stable spouse of any participant in W m or M m reveals the value of DISJ(x,ȳ). Thus, by Theorem 2.4, B = Ω(n 2 ).
Proof of Theorem 3.5. We prove Part a. of the theorem. Suppose there is a randomized algorithm A that computes a (1 − ε)-stable marriage using B Boolean queries to the women and men. We will use A to construct a B-bit communication protocol for the approximate stable marriage problem. The protocol works as follows. Alice and Bob both simulate A. Whenever A queries the women's preferences, Alice sends the result of the query to Bob (since Alice knows the women's preferences 
Commentary and Open Problems
The classical Gale-Shapley algorithm [4] terminates after O(n 2 ) proposals, and each proposal consists of a message of O(log n) bits. Thus, the Gale-Shapley algorithm provides a communication upper bound of O(n 2 log n) for the problem of finding a stable marriage. Our Corollary 3.1 matches this up to a logarithmic factor, but it is not immediately clear how to close this gap.
Open Problem 6.1. What is the communication complexity of finding a stable marriage?
Our definition of (1 − ε)-stability is nonstandard. A more common notion of approximate stability is that a marriage induce few (say at most εn 2 ) blocking pairs (see [3] ). We remark that the blocking-pairs notion of approximate stability is strictly coarser than ours. It is natural to ask if the Ω(n 2 ) communication lower bound of Theorem 3.1 holds for blocking-pairs approximate stability as well.
Open Problem 6.2. Is there a protocol Π that computes a marriage with at most εn 2 blocking pairs using o(n 2 ) communication?
Recently, Ostrovsky and Rosenbaum [12] showed that it is possible to find a marriage with εn 2 blocking pairs for arbitrary ε > 0 using O(1) communication rounds for a distributed model of computation. While their result does not imply anything nontrivial about the total communication, we believe their techniques may be relevant for finding o(n 2 ) communication protocols for blockingpairs approximate stability (if such protocols exist). Interestingly, an analogue of Theorem 3.2 does not hold for blocking-pairs approximate stability. Theorem 6.1. For every ε ≥ δ > 0, there exists a randomized communication protocol Π that determines whether a given marriage µ induces at least εn 2 blocking pairs or at most (ε − δ)n 2 blocking pairs using O(log n) communication. In particular, Π determines whether µ is stable or has εn 2 blocking pairs using O(log n) communication.
Proof sketch. Choose a pair (w, m) uniformly at random from W × M . If m prefers w over his spouse in µ, the men query the women to see if w also prefers m over her spouse in µ using O(log n) communication. The probability that (w, m) is a blocking pair is precisely ε , where ε is the fraction of blocking pairs in µ. Repeat this procedure to estimate ε to any desired accuracy in a bounded number of steps depending only on the desired accuracy. Theorem 3.4 shows that any protocol that produces a constant fraction of pairs in a stable marriage (regardless of which pairs are found) requires Ω(n 2 ) communication. It would be interesting to improve this result (or find an efficient protocol) for finding even a single pair that appears in a stable marriage.
Open Problem 6.3. What is the communication complexity of finding a single pair (w, m) that appears in some/every stable marriage?
Finally, we notice that in contrast to e.g. Theorems 3.2 and 3.4, our statement of Theorem 3.1 requires that ε < 1/2. It is natural to ask what can be obtained regarding other values of ε.
Open Problem 6.4. 
A Embedding Arbitrary Preferences into Complete Preferences
This section contains the remaining technical details needed to complete the direct proof of Corollary 3.1 given in Section 4. • µ is stable with respect to P W and P M .
• µ is a submarriage of some marriage between W ∪ W and M ∪ M that is stable with respect to P W ∪W (P W ) and P M ∪M (P M ).
Proof. 8 Denote W = {w 1 , . . . , w n }, M = {m 1 , . . . , m n }, W = {w 1 , . . . , w n }, and M = {m 1 , . . . , m n }. To define P W ∪W (P W ), for every i we define the preference list of w i to consist of her preference list in P W (in the same order), followed by m i , followed by all other men in arbitrary order; we define the preference list of w i to consist of m i , followed by all other men in arbitrary order. Similarly, to define P M ∪M (P M ), for every j we define the preference list of m j to consist of his preference list in P M (in the same order), followed by w j , followed by all other women in arbitrary order; we define the preference list of m j to consist of w j , followed by all other women in arbitrary order.
It is straightforward to verify that the lemma holds with respect to these definitions of P W ∪W and P M ∪M ; the details are left to the reader.
Remark A.1. It is straightforward to embed the problem of finding a stable marriage w.r.t. full preference lists in that of finding a stable marriage w.r.t. arbitrary preference lists, as the former is a special case of the latter.
B Determining the Marital Status of a Given Couple or Participant
In this appendix, we give an alternate proof of Theorem 3.3, which uses the construction of Section 4. We prove Theorem 3.3 once again using Theorem 2.4, by embedding disjointness in both problems. We embed disjointness via an intermediate problem of determining whether a given participant is single (i.e. not married to anyone) in some stable marriage, given profiles of arbitrary (i.e. not necessarily full) preference lists. 9 We therefore obtain the same lower bounds for this problem as well. 
[n] 2 , the following are equivalent.
• p is single in some stable marriage w.r.t. P W (x) and P M (ȳ).
• DISJ(x,ȳ) = 0.
Proof. Assume w.l.o.g. that p ∈ W and denote w p. Denote W = {w 1 , . . . , w n , w, w 2 , w 3 , . . . , w n } and M = {m 1 , . . . , m n , m 1 , . . . , m n }.
To define P W (x), for every i we define the preference list of w i to consist of all m j s.t. x i j = 1, in arbitrary order (say, sorted by j), followed by m i (with all other men absent). We define the preference list of w to consist of all m j , in arbitrary order (say, sorted by j), with all other men absent. We define the preference list of every w i to be empty (these women can be ignored, and are defined purely for aesthetic reasons -so that W and M be of equal cardinality). To define P M (ȳ), for every j we define the preference list of m j to consist of all w i s.t. y i j = 1, in arbitrary order (say, sorted by i), with all other women absent. For every j we define the preference list of m j to consist of w j , followed by w (with all other women absent).
Let µ id be the marriage in which w i is married to m i for every i, and in which all other participants are single. We first show that DISJ(x,ȳ) = 0 iff µ id is stable, and then show that µ id is stable iff w = p is single in some stable marriage; we commence with the former.
We begin by noting that every participant that is married in µ id is married to someone on their preference list; therefore, µ id is stable iff no pair would rather deviate. Obviously, no w i would rather deviate with anyone. Furthermore, while w would rather deviate with any m j , these are all married to their top choices, and so none of them would deviate with w. Since for every i, the preference list of w i consists of m i and of a subset of {m j } j =i , we therefore have that µ id is unstable iff there exists (i, j) ∈ [n] 2 s.t. both m j w i m i and w i is on the preference list of m j . Similarly to the proof of Lemma 4.2, this holds precisely if there exists (i, j) ∈ [n] 2 s.t. x i j = 1 and y i j = 1, which holds iff DISJ(x,ȳ) = 0.
We complete the proof by showing that µ id is stable iff w = p is single in some stable marriage. The first direction follows immediately from the fact that w is single in µ id . For the second direction, assume that there exists a stable marriage µ in which w is single. By stability of µ and since all men on the preference list of w have w on their preference list, all such men are married in µ and prefer their spouses over w. Therefore, for every j, we have that m j is married to w j in µ. By stability of µ, every w i is single in µ. As µ and µ id coincide on all women, we have that µ = µ id . Therefore, µ id = µ is stable and the proof is complete. • w is single in some marriage between W and M that is stable w.r.t. P W and P M .
• w and m are married in some marriage between W ∪ W and M ∪ M that is stable w.r.t. P W ∪W (P W ) and P M ∪M (P M ).
• w and m are married in every marriage between W ∪ W and M ∪ M that is stable w.r.t. P W ∪W (P W ) and P M ∪M (P M ).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma A.1. Denote W = {w 1 = w, w 2 , . . . , w n }, M = {m 1 , . . . , m n }, W = {w 1 , . . . , w n }, and M = {m 1 = m , m 2 , . . . , m n }. To define P W ∪W (P W ), for every i we define the preference list of w i to consist of her preference list in P W (in the same order), followed by m i , followed by all other men in arbitrary order; we define the preference list of w i to consist of m i , followed by all other men in arbitrary order. Similarly, to define P M ∪M (P M ), for every j we define the preference list of m j to consist of his preference list in P M (in the same order), followed by w j , followed by all other women in arbitrary order; we define the preference list of m j to consist of w j , followed by all other women in arbitrary order.
Similarly to the proof of Lemma A.1, we have that w is single in some marriage µ between W and M that is stable w.r.t. P W and P M iff w and m are married in some marriage (a corresponding "supermarriage" of µ) between W ∪ W and M ∪ M that is stable w.r.t. P W ∪W (P W ) and P M ∪M (P M ). Additionally, by Theorem 2.3 (in conjunction with Theorem 2.1), we have: w is single in some marriage between W and M that is stable w.r.t. P W and P M ⇐⇒ w is single in every marriage between W and M that is stable w.r.t. P W and P M ⇐⇒ w and m are married in every marriage between W ∪ W and M ∪ M that is stable w.r.t. P W ∪W (P W ) and P M ∪M (P M ).
C Verifying the Output of a Given Stable Marriage Mechanism
As noted in Section 3, while the lower bound of Corollary 3.2 are tight, we do now know whether that of Corollary 3.1 is tight as well. We note that we do not even know a tight lower bound for verifying whether a given marriage is the M -optimal stable marriage.
Open Problem C.1. What is the worst-case complexity of verifying whether a given marriage is the M -optimal stable marriage?
As in the case of Open Problem 1.1, we do not have any o(n 2 log n) algorithm for verification of the M -optimal stable marriage, even randomized and even in the strong two-party communication model, nor do we have any ω(n 2 ) lower bound, even for deterministic algorithms and even in the simple comparison model.
In this section, we the derive a Ω(n 2 ) lower bound for verification of the M -optimal stable marriage. In fact, we show this lower bound not only for verifying the M -optimal stable marriage, but also for verifying the output of any other stable marriage mechanism. Proof. We define P W ∪W (P W ) and P M ∪M (P M ) as in Lemma A.1, only with M appearing sorted by j (as opposed to in arbitrary order) on the preference lists of W , and with W appearing sorted by i (as opposed to in arbitrary order) on the preference lists of M . By Lemma A.1, we have both that b. holds, and that if µ id is the unique stable marriage w.r.t. P W and P M , then it is a submarriage of every marriage that is stable w.r.t. P W ∪W (P W ) and P M ∪M (P M ); it is straightforward to show that every "supermarriage" of µ id , apart from µ id , is unstable, thus proving a. as well.
Open Problem C.2. Is there a stable marriage mechanism whose worst-case output verification complexity is Θ(n 2 )? Which stable marriage mechanisms have the lowest asymptotic worst-case output verification complexity?
D Nondeterminism
All the lower bounds in this paper are based upon reductions to the well-studied communication complexity of the disjointness function. Since the disjointness function also has Θ(n) nondeterministic communication complexity [9] , it follows that all our lower bounds apply not only to randomized communication complexity, but also to nondeterministic communication complexity. For nondeterministic communication complexity, the Ω(n 2 ) lower bound for finding a stable marriage is in fact tight (and so still is the Ω(n 2 ) bound for verification of stability).
For the decision problem of verifying the stability of a given marriage, the co-nondeterministic communication complexity may be easily seen to be Θ(log n). In contrast, we note that the proof of Theorem 3.3 may be easily adapted to show a Ω(n 2 ) lower bound also for the co-nondeterministic communication complexities of determining the marital status of a given couple. • w is single in some marriage between W and M that is stable w.r.t. P W and P M .
• m is married in every marriage between W ∪ {w } and M ∪ {m } that is stable w.r.t. P W ∪{w } (P W ) and P M ∪{m } (P M ).
Proof. To define P W ∪{w } (P W ), we define the preference list of w as her preference list in P W (in the same order), followed by m ; we define the preference list of every other woman in W as her preference list in P W (in the same order and with m absent), and define the preference list of w to be empty (once again, w can be ignored, and is defined purely for aesthetic reasons -so that W ∪ {w } and M ∪ {m } be of equal cardinality). To define P M ∪{m } (P M ), we define the preference list of every man in M as his preference list in P M (in the same order and with w absent); we define the preference list of m to consist solely of w.
Directly from definition of P M ∪M and P W ∪W , we have that a natural bijection µ → µ exists between stable marriages w.r.t. P W and P M and stable marriages w.r.t. P W ∪{w } (P W ) and P M ∪{m } (P M ); this bijection is given by:
• If w is married in µ, then µ µ (with m and w single in µ ).
• If w is single in µ, then µ is the marriage obtained from µ by marrying w to m (with w once again single in µ ).
Once again by Theorem 2.3 (in conjunction with Theorem 2.1), and by the existence of this bijection, we have: w is single in some marriage between W and M that is stable w.r.t. P W and P M ⇐⇒ w is single in every marriage between W and M that is stable w.r.t. P W and P M ⇐⇒ m is married in every marriage between W ∪ {w } and M ∪ {m } that is stable w.r.t. P W ∪{w } (P W ) and P M ∪{m } (P M ).
We note that the nondeterministic lower bound of Ω(n 2 ) for determining whether a given couple is married in some stable marriage, as well as the co-nondeterministic lower bound of Ω(n 2 ) for determining whether a given couple is married in every stable marriage (and both the nondeterministic and co-nondeterministic lower bounds of Ω(n 2 ) for determining whether a given participant is single in some/every stable marriage), is in fact tight. (Recall that we do not know whether any of these problems can be deterministically or even probabilistically solved using o(n 2 log n) communication.) The questions of a tight co-nondeterministic lower bound for the former problem and a tight nondeterministic lower bound for the latter remain open in all query models. We note that the latter problem may be solved by checking whether the pair in question is married in both the M -optimal stable marriage and the W -optimal stable marriage; a O(n 2 )-Boolean-queries algorithm (even a nondeterministic one) for verification of the M -optimal stable marriage (see Open Problem C.1 in Appendix C) would therefore also settle the question of the nondeterministic communication complexity of this problem. E Optimality of Deferred Acceptance w.r.t.
Queries onto Women
Gale and Shapley's (1962) proof of Theorem 2.1 is constructive, providing an efficient algorithm for finding the M -optimal stable marriage. In this algorithm, men are asked queries of the form "which woman is next on the preference list of man m after woman w?" (or alternatively, "which woman does man m rank at place k?"), while women are asked queries of the form "whom does woman w prefer most out of the set of menM ?"; all of these queries require an answer of length O(log n) bits. Dubins and Freedman [2] presented a variant of Gale and Shapley's algorithm, which runs in the same worst-case time complexity, but performs a significantly more limited class of queries, namely only pairwise-comparison queries, onto women. In Open Problem 1.1 in the Introduction, we raise the question of a tight lower bound for the complexity of finding a stable marriage using only such queries for both women and men. In this section, we show that regardless of how complex the queries onto the men may be, no algorithm for finding any stable marriage (and even no algorithm for verifying the stability of a given marriage, when input a stable marriage) that performs only pairwise-comparison queries onto women, may perform any less such queries onto them than Dubins and Freedman's variant of Gale and Shapley's algorithm (given the same preference lists). For the duration of this section, let n ∈ N, let W and M be disjoint sets s.t. |W | = |M | = n.
Definition E.1 (Pairwise-Comparison Query). A pairwise-comparison query onto W is a query of whether m w m for some given w ∈ W and m, m ∈ M . Definition E.2 (Men-Proposing Deferred-Acceptance Algorithm [2] ). The following algorithm is henceforth referred to as the men-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm: The algorithm is initialized with all women and all men being provisionally single, and concludes when no man is provisionally single. The algorithm is divided into steps, to which we refer as nights. On each night, an arbitrary provisionally-single man m is chosen, and serenades under the window of the woman w ranked highest on his preference list among those who have not (yet) rejected him. If w is provisionally single, then m and w are provisionally married to each other. Otherwise, i.e. if w is already provisionally married to some man m , then if m w m , then w rejects m , who becomes provisionally single, and w and m are provisionally married to each other; otherwise, w rejects m, who remains provisionally single. The algorithm stops when no provisionally-single men remain, and the couples married by the output marriage are exactly those that are provisionally married when the algorithm stops.
Theorem E.1 ([2]). Let P W ∈ F(W, M ) and P M ∈ F(M, W ) be profiles of full preference lists for W over M and for M over W , respectively. The men-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm stops after O(n 2 ) nights, and yields the M -optimal stable marriage.
Remark E.1. Let P W ∈ F(W, M ) and let P M ∈ F(M, W ). All runs of the men-proposing deferredacceptance algorithm (given P W and P M ) perform the same number of pairwise-comparison queries onto W .
Theorem E.2 (Optimality of Men-Proposing Deferred-Acceptance Algorithm w.r.t. Pairwise-Comparison Queries onto W ). For any profiles P W ∈ F(W, M ) and P M ∈ F(M, W ) of full preference lists for W over M and for M over W , respectively, every algorithm for finding or verifying a stable marriage (for the latter -when input any marriage that is stable w.r.t. P W and P M ) that only performs pairwise-comparison queries onto W (and arbitrary queries onto M ), performs no less queries onto W than the men-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm, when input P W and P M .
Remark E.2. An analogous result may similarly be shown to hold w.r.t. profiles of arbitrary preference lists, and finding/verifying a possibly-imperfect stable marriage. Definition E.3. Let µ be a perfect marriage between W and M . By slight abuse of notation, we denote the woman married to a man m ∈ M in µ by µ(m) instead of µ −1 (m).
Proof of Theorem E.2. Let A be a run of the men-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm w.r.t. P W and P M , and let B be a given run of an algorithm for finding/verifying a stable marriage w.r.t. P W and P M . Let Q ⊆ W × M 2 be the set of triples (w, m, m ) s.t. either the query of whether m w m was performed onto W during B and answered positively, or the query of whether m w m was performed onto W during B and answered negatively. By definition, at least |Q| queries onto W are performed during B. Let µ be the M -optimal stable marriage w.r.t. P W and P M , i.e. the marriage output by A. Let R (w, m) | w rejects m during A ⊆ W × M . By definition, we note that the number of queries onto W during A equals the number of rejections performed during A, and so, as no woman rejects the same man twice, equals |R|. It is therefore enough to show that |R| ≤ |Q| in order to complete the proof.
Let µ be the output of B if it is a run of an algorithm for finding a stable marriage, or the input to B if it is a run of an algorithm for verifying stability; either way, µ a stable marriage w.r.t. P W and P M . We claim that w m µ (m) for every (w, m) ∈ R. Indeed, as m serenades under women's windows during A in descending order of preference, the fact that w rejects m during A implies w m µ(m). By Theorem E.1, we thus have w m µ(m) m µ (m), as claimed. As B guarantees the stability of µ , it must therefore ascertain that µ (w) w m for every (w, m) ∈ R; therefore,
